More CSIRTs, the merrier? Pros and cons of multiple Cyber Incident Response Teams

Proponents of multiple CSIRTs argue that this structure offers several compelling benefits: 

• Enhanced specialisation and expertise: Distinct CSIRTs, tailored to specific sectors like finance or government, can cultivate deep expertise in their constituencies’ unique cyber threats and challenges. This focused approach can lead to more effective and targeted responses. 

• Mutual support and capacity-building: A network of CSIRTs fosters an environment of mutual support and cooperation. Teams can share knowledge, resources, and best practices, strengthening the nation’s cyber incident response capabilities. 

• Fostering competition and innovation: Multiple CSIRTs can inject a healthy dose of competition, driving institutional and organisational growth as teams strive to improve their services and effectiveness. 

• Quicker incident response: With more teams on the ground, multiple CSIRTs can potentially provide faster and more localised incident responses, minimising the impact of cyberattacks. 

• Improved local and regional coordination: Localised or regional CSIRTs can more effectively coordinate responses to incidents with specific geographical implications, leveraging their understanding of local infrastructure and stakeholders. 

• Tailored mitigation strategies: Specialised CSIRTs can develop and implement mitigation strategies and solutions that are precisely tailored to the cyber challenges faced by their specific sectors, leading to more effective outcomes. 

• Familiarity with constituencies: Sector-specific CSIRTs possess a deeper understanding of their organisations’ unique operational environments and needs, facilitating smoother and more effective incident handling. 

• Decentralised decision-making in crises: Without a central national CSIRT, having multiple specialised teams ensures transparent decision-making processes are in place during widespread cyber crises. 

Despite the potential advantages, the discussion also illuminated significant challenges associated with having numerous CSIRTs: 

• Security concerns and intelligence sharing: Sharing sensitive cyber threat intelligence becomes more complex without standardised procedures and protocols across different CSIRT teams, potentially raising security concerns. 

• Lack of standardisation: When each CSIRT operates with its own rules, procedures, and “playbooks,” it can hinder effective collaboration and create inconsistencies in incident response approaches. 

• Budget constraints: Maintaining multiple CSIRT teams inevitably increases expenditure, potentially straining national cybersecurity budgets. 

• Potential power struggles and confusion: Overlapping responsibilities and a lack of clear delineation of authority between multiple CSIRTs can lead to power struggles and confusion during incident response efforts. 

• Coordination and communication issues: Ensuring seamless collaboration and coordination between various independent CSIRT teams presents a significant logistical and operational hurdle. 

The debate surrounding the optimal number of CSIRTs underscores the complexity of building a robust national cybersecurity framework. While specialisation and distributed capabilities offer clear benefits, the risks associated with fragmentation and a lack of coordination cannot be ignored. 

The ongoing discussions within the wider CSIRT community are crucial in navigating these complexities. Finding the right balance, perhaps through establishing clear national standards, robust communication channels, and well-defined roles and responsibilities, will be essential to harnessing the potential of multiple CSIRTs while mitigating the inherent challenges. The question of “more CSIRTs, merrier” ultimately hinges on fostering effective collaboration and coherence within a potentially diverse landscape.